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THE CHANCELLOR'S BOOT
Stephen B. Burbank*
It is a privilege to comment on a paper by Judge Weinstein,
of whom one can say, after Justice Jackson: "He is not non-final
because he is inferior, but he is inferior only because he is non
final."1 At least comparing the Judge's opinion on Rule 11 sanc
tions in Eastway Construction Corp.

v.

City of New York2 with

the opinions of his "superiors"3 leaves that abiding impression.
A comparison of those opinions also recalls another tribute to
Walter Wheeler Cook,4 whose deconstruction of Joseph Beale's
vested rights theory, in the words of Brainerd Currie, "discred
ited ... [it] as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever
discredit the intellectual product of another."11 One hears much
these days about the independence of the federal judiciary; one
hears less about the independence of individual federal judges. I
suspect that Judge Weinstein's years in academe contributed
more than deep learning to his career as a judge.
For one in my position to spend all his time distributing
bouquets would be as surprising as a book reviewer spending
any of his time talking about the book.6 Lest I surprise the

* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, Harvard Uni
versity. The author presented these comments on Judge Weinstein's paper, together with
comments on a paper by Dean Paul Carrington, Duke Law School, at the meeting of the
Section of Civil Procedure, American Association of Law Schools, on January 9, 1988.
' See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).

637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (demonstrating on remand why sanctions

2

inappropriate).
Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing

3

denial of sanctions and requiring sanction of attorney's fees); Eastway Const. Corp. v.
City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1987) (increasing sanction of $1,000 im
posed by Judge Weinstein on client to $10,000 on client and attorney without explana
tion why the former constituted an abuse of discretion).
Dean Carrington's paper, see supra note*, was entitled "An Appreciation of Wal
•

ter Wheeler Cook, Erie, and the Rules Enabling Act."
•

B. CuRRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CoNFLICT or LAws 6 (1963).
Book reviews are of two types: those in which the reviewer has read the

book, and those (the vast majority) in which he has not. When the book has
been read this is shown by pointing out a few printers' errors, but this is the
only difference between the two, and, normally, a perfectly satisfactory review
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reader, I will offer a few observations about Judge Weinstein's
paper that are intended to suggest different perspectives, per
spectives that may inform our thinking about the procedure of
the future.
In his paper Judge Weinstein demonstrates both the power
ful vision of justice that has marked his career as a judge and
the practical vision of politics that has marked his career as a
scholar. The paper raises, at least for me, the question whether
the Judge has succeeded in reconciling those visions and, more
important, whether they can and should be reconciled as we con
template procedure for the twenty-first century.
Judge Weinstein indicates that, in his courtroom, "the fed
eral rules are of little significance."7 He also chronicles various
respects in which the system of open access that came to be as
sociated with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has in recent
years been modified, formally and informally, attributing a de
cline in "society's egalitarian consciousness"8 to "massive demo
graphic, economic and sociological factors rather than the details
of

the Federal Rules."9

But,

having

earlier

observed

that

" [j]udicial reform, though almost invisible, can have powerful
secondary effects on society,"10 he takes heart in the notion that
"the inertia inherent in any procedural system, and the institu
tional structures which have an interest in maintaining the sta
tus quo, ensure that swift radical changes in procedure are un
likely."11 Finally, Judge Weinstein finds in the Federal Rules
and Erie "useful windows into the personality of our legal sys
tem," which he defines as "compassion for people who claim to
have been wronged, . . . reliance on the good sense of judges,
... faith in the usefulness of lawyers, and, ultimately, ... opti
mistic confidence that the people will use their political institu
tions for what is right and decent."�2
What we have here, I suggest, is a combination of personal

can be produced after a brief perusal of the Author's Preface, which is
designed for just this purpose.

Anonymous, How to Become a Jurist, 7 J. Soc'v Pus. L. TcHRS. 129, 133 (1963).
7

Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 28 (1988).
8

!d.

9

!d.

10
11

12

!d. at 2.
!d. at 27.
!d. at 29-30.
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politics and wishful thinking. To the extent that the Federal
Rules are merely charters for discretionary decision-making,13 it
is no surprise that they are of little significance in Judge Wein
stein's courtroom - or in the courtroom of federal judges who
do not share his politics. What reason have we to hope that, as
judges of Jack Weinstein's sympathies are replaced by those
whose interests lie elsewhere, "the personality of our legal sys
tem" he describes willl}ot seem as remote as the history of the
Rules Enabling Act? If indeed the courthouse door has been
closed as a result of "demographic, economic and sociological
factors"14 - the economic part of that equation at least requires
refinement - are not more far-reaching modifications in atti
tudes towards litigation and towards individual rights assured?
A historical view hardly supports Judge Weinstein's descrip
tion of "the personality of our legal system," but history does
illuminate the tensions that are evident in his paper. How re
markable that individuals of such radically different politics as
William Howard Taft and Charles Clark should have supported
the bill that became the Rules Enabling Act. Grant that Clark
would have been as unhappy as Judge Weinstein with recent de
velopments, would Taft? I venture that Taft would have been
pleased, both because those developments are consistent with
what I understand of his politics15 and because they have come
about through exercises of power by judges, at times in the teeth
of contrary legislation. In the field of procedure, Taft was largely
responsible for ensuring that two personalities became one, as
equity gobbled up common law.16 We should neither be sur
prised that, in this field, there are now almost as many personal
ities as there are federal judges, nor that what some chancellors
have given, others are taking away.17
If only because we are seeing fewer and fewer judges like
Jack Weinstein, perhaps we should take more seriously the duty

13

See, e.g., Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book

Review), 85

MICH. L.

REv.

1463, 1473-76 (1987).
" Weinstein, supra note 7, at 28.
" See, e.g., Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Ciuil Procedure in Historical Perspectiue,

bank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68

-

135

U. PA. L.

REv. 909, 952-56 (1987); Bur
19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 425,

Time to Abandon Ship,

427 (1986).
16

See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,

(1982); Subrin,

15, at 956-61.
note 13, at 1470.

supra note

" Burbank, supra

130

U. PA. L.

REv. 1015, 1069-76
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he acknowledges of applying the law to the facts. In order to do
that, we will need to be able to ascertain what the law is, and it
will be necessary to curb judges' power to deny or subvert sub
stance in the guise of procedure. It may also be necessary to
regain a measure of confidence in the Congress. After all, as
Judge Weinstein admits/8 the rulemakers botched Rule 4 before
Congress completed the job, and it was congressional pressure
that sealed the fate of proposals to amend Rule 68.19 More gen
erally, it is judges who have been closing the courthouse door,
not Congress. That they have been doing it under a system of
equity rules may make the suggestion that we consider putting
more law in a merged system20 seem not "stingier,"21 as Judge
Weinstein describes it, but more liberal, at least in the sense of
valuing rights. Senator Walsh had good reason to be worried.

18
19
20
21

See Weinstein, supra note 7. at 29.
See Burbank, supra note 15, at 439-40.
See Subrin, supra note 15, at 982-1002; Burbank, supra note 13. passim.
Weinstein, supra note 7, at 3.

